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the County was not an "interested person" entitled to file an objection in this
case because it had no such protected interest.
Second, the County contended that "interested persons" should encompass
more than those persons who have existing water rights because the statute requires the director to give notice of the applications. The County reasoned that
if "interested persons" were only those having an interest protected by statute,
it could send notice directly to those persons, rather than circulating notice in a
newspaper. The Court found this argument unpersuasive because publication
requirements are not inconsistent with imposing limitations on who may file
objections.
Third, the County argued it qualified as an "interested person" because approval of the severance and transfer would cause it injury. Specifically, the severance would increase tax burdens on county residents and could negatively
affect water supplies. The Court found that this argument improperly conflated
standing, which requires plaintiffs to allege sufficient injury in order to appear
in court.
Fourth, the County claimed that the ADWR must first consult with the
County before deciding on applications under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-269.09(A).
The County also contended it has an obligation under Ariz. Rev. State § 11-804
to protect water resources in the county. The Court found neither statute applied.
Last, the County argued the Court should construe § 45-172(A) liberally to
"promote the ends of justice." The County cited Aimer v. Superior Court,in
which the Court adopted this approach when interpreting the phrase "party
beneficially interested." Finding that "any interested person" was not synonymous with the phrase "party beneficially interested," the Court declined to
adopt this approach.
Accordingly, the Court vacated the superior court judgment and affirmed
the ADWR's final decision.
Kelly Ledoux

COLORADO
In the Matter of Water Rights, 361 P.3d 392 (Colo. 2015) (holding that: (i)
the Colorado Ground Water Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial
determination of whether the water at issue was designated ground water; and
(ii) a portion of the stomn runoff water at issue was "designated ground water"
under the Groundwater Management Act, rather than surface water).
The Colorado Ground Water Commission ("Commission") held hearings
in 1967 and 1968 in order to resolve the proper designation of a ground water
basin in the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Basin ("Basin"). It found that "'virtually all' of the water in the basin was underground water, and water flowed on
the surface only 'during and immediately following' periods of heavy rainfall
from summer storns." The water was also not adjacent to a continuously flowing natural stream and would never reach a tributary system. As such, the Commission determined that the Basin qualified as a designated ground water basin,
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and entered its findings in a final order (the "1968 Order").
The Meridian Service Metropolitan District ("Meridian") proposed a development in the Basin area. Its development would result in an increase in
surface water runoff due to the creation of impermeable surfaces. In 2011,
Meridian filed an application for such surface water rights in the District Court
for Water Division No. 2 ("Water Court"). In its application, Meridian sought
conditional rights to divert and store runoff water from an unspecified Upper
Black SquirTel Creek tributary. Opposers challenged the Water Court's jurisdiction to hear the matter because while Meridian characterized the water in its
application as "storm run-off," the water directly recharges the Basin and is
therefore designated ground water subject to the Commission's administration.
The Water Court agreed that Meridian's application presented a jurisdictional
question, and the Water Court and stayed its proceedings while Meridian initiated a case before the Conurnission.
A hearing officer for the Commission concluded that the water Meridian
sought to appropriate was designated ground water and not surface water. The
hearing officer reasoned that, except for Meridian's development of impermeable surfaces, falling precipitation in the Basin would either recharge the aquifer, evaporate, or hydrate plants. The Commission affirmed the hearing officer's conclusion, and Meridian appealed to the El Paso County District Court
("District Court"). The District Court agreed with the Commission and concluded that naturally falling precipitation would not reach a tributary system,
and as such, the surface streanms are "'only streams because they are manmade."' Therefore, the District Court denied Meridian's application for surface water rights.
On appeal, Meridian made four arguments before the Supreme Court of
Colorado ("Court"). It argued: (i) the Commission did not have subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case; (ii) the Commission improperly classified the storm
runoff as designated groundwater water; (iii) claim preclusion barred the Commission from finding that a portion of water was designated ground water; and
(iv) public policy concerns weighed in its favor.
The Court first addressed Meridian's jurisdictional-based argument in
which Meridian argued that the Water Court, not the Commission, had jurisdiction over the case because the issues involved conditional rights and surface
water. In support of this argument, Meridian referenced The Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act"), which grants water
courts jurisdiction over "water matters" in the state. The 1969 Act, however,
"applies only to the administration of surface and underground water that is in
or tributary to natural streams." In contrast, The Colorado Groundwater Management Act ("Management Act") grants the Commission jurisdiction over designated ground water issues. More importantly, in the case of a jurisdictional
conflict between the deciding bodies, jurisdiction vests with the Commission to
initially determine if designated ground water was at issue. The water court only
obtains jurisdiction if the Commission concludes that the contested water is not
designated ground water. Accordingly, because this case involved a jurisdictional issue, the Court rejected Meridian's argument and found that the Commission had jurisdiction to make an initial determination.
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Next, the Court turned to the issue of classification. Meridian contended
that the District Court erred by finding that the water at issue was designated
ground water, and not surface water. In making a determination, the Court first
looked at the Management Act, which defines "designated ground water" as
"ground water which in its natural course would not be available to and required
for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights." The Management Act also defines
"ground water" as "any water not visible on the surface of the ground under
natural conditions." Considering these definitions and the record, the Court
upheld the District Court's finding that the water Meridian sought to divert was
not simply surface water. The Court found ample support in the record to
conclude that a portion of the water Meridian sought to appropriate was the
result of man-made impermeable surfaces and did not occur naturally, except
during heavy rain events. The Court also rejected Meridian's definitional arguments based on case law because the facts of the cases were too dissimilar.
The Court then turned to Meridian's argument that claim preclusion prevented the Commission from finding that a portion of the water at issue was
designated ground water. Meridian contended that claim preclusion occurred
because the Commfission stated in its 1968 Order that only water in the Basin
was designated ground water. The Court found that claim preclusion did not
apply because the earlier and present proceedings did not involve identical
claims for relief. Additionally, the runoff water at issue in this case, created in
part by Meridian's development, could not have been a part of a lawsuit in 1968.
Finally, the Court addressed Meridian's public policy argument and held
that the District Court's reasoning, and not Meridian's, was consistent with public policy for three reasons. First, the Court reasoned that allowing people to
own a previously untapped water supply, resulting from development that replaced natural land conditions, would be contrary to public policy. Second, the
Court found that it could not condone Meridian's application because doing so
would result in a type of unprecedented "'super decree"' that would allow Meridian access to the water "free from both the call of the Arkansas River and the
Commission's oversight." Third, even though only four percent of precipitation
recharges the aquifer, the Court found that granting Meridian's application
would have resulted in an overall reduced rate of recharge, which would harm
senior designated ground water users.
Accordingly, the Court affirned the District Court's holding on all four issues.

Kobl Webb
MONTANA
Teton Co-op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir, 365 P.3d 442 (Mont
2015) (holding: (i) the Water Court's finding that Teton Canal's predecessors
in interest did not develop a certain diversion point was clearly erroneous because they developed the diversion point to build Glendora Canal; (ii) the Water Court's finding that the Eureka Reservoir's priority date related back to the
1890 Notice was incorrect because the 1890 Notice did not contemplate the

